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Abstract 
This paper presents a decentralized cooperative economic scheduling mechanism for a supply chain 
environment. For this purpose, we design autonomous agents that minimize the production or 
transportation and outsourcing costs incurred by the external execution of a task. The decentralized 
cooperative scheduling approach comprises two parts: the individual optimization of an agent’s local 
schedule  and  the cooperative contract optimization, either by outsourcing the task or by (re-
)contracting the release time and due time with the contract partners aiming to maximize their total 
profits. A negotiation mechanism based on trust accounts is employed to protect the agents against 
systematic exploitation by their partners. 
 Keywords: decentralized scheduling, cooperative agents, production and transportation integration, 
supply chain networks 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Approaches to cooperative management of inter-organizational supply chains have attracted a great 
deal of attention in recent years. But their focus on synchronizing supply and demand in order to 
collaboratively reduce stock and idle time of production capacity has aggravated the problem of low 
truck loading rather than contributed to sustainable logistics. 
In short-term production scheduling cooperative approaches have not yet become standard, at least not 
in the sense that the opportunity cost of the logistics services concerned (whose preferred pickup and 
delivery times might vary) would be accounted for in the production scheduling process. Production 
and logistics scheduling tend to be planned successively: Due dates of the supplier are synchronized 
with prospective release times of the customer and then provided as exogenous data to the logistics 
planner (or external service provider), whose task is to meet the given pick-up and delivery times and 
not to renegotiate them. Such negotiation, although it would be crucial for the simultaneous 
optimization of the complete supply chain, comprised by production and logistics, is found hardly 
anywhere, neither in practice nor in literature. 
Since real-life supply chain management (SCM) is closely related to problems caused by the divergent 
interests of the actors (enterprises) and the distributed structure of the underlying optimization 
(scheduling), one natural way to address this constellation is to employ a holonic multi-agent system 
(MAS), in which the process structure is mapped onto single agents (Eymann 2001). Each agent - 
operating a single production facility or vehicle fleet - maximizes its own profit by determining an 
optimal internal schedule. To streamline the production and transportation process and avoid penalty 
costs due to processing bottlenecks or late delivery, agents carry out economic scheduling. 
Accordingly, they employ ‘outsourcing contracts’ to reduce their production or transportation load and 
optimize their schedules. The negotiation has to be seen as an inter-agent schedule optimization 
process, leading to the social contract equilibrium of the MAS based on prices calculated according to 
the production and transportation load. Due to the fact that the calculation of these negotiated prices 
cannot be directly monitored by the contract partners, a trust protocol has been included to foster 
truthful bidding. Moreover, by implementing an incentive compatible mechanism to avoid exploitation 
by competitors, our decentralized supply chain optimization system is able to deal with other agency 
problems like the unwillingness of actors to reveal sensitive but (in terms of system optimization) 
valuable information. We address the revelation issue by introducing a trust account mechanism, 
which helps to prevent individual long-term exploitation. The trust mechanism is directly integrated 
into the schedule optimization procedure, similar to Padovan et al. (2002). 
In this paper we address the question of how logistics costs may be reduced by exploiting scheduling 
flexibilities of the supply chain partners. For this purpose we extend the “DISPOsitive WEB” protocol 
of Stockheim et al. (2005). Whereas the DISPOWEB protocol described by Stockheim et al. focuses 
solely on the negotiation of Pareto-efficient delivery contracts for a production plan between 
production agents, while avoiding the exploitation of negotiation partners by the use of trust accounts, 
this work also integrates the negotiation of transportation planning agents into the process. We think 
that, by modelling our optimization problem as an integrated agent-based planning process, we are 
able to guarantee a more appropriate mapping of real world situations in SCM (Caridi et al. 2004) and 
for this reason the DISPOWEB mechanism is able to provide a higher solution quality for our scenario 
than traditional centralized operations methods can. However, we have to prove this by testing our 
MAS model with real world data, as will be described in the last section. 
The paper is organized as follows: The next section summarizes the literature relevant to our research, 
followed by the formal description of the agent-based integrated production and distribution planning 
problem (ABIPDP). Section four presents the negotiation mechanism that is used to find feasible 
solutions for the ABIPDP. The last section summarises the simulation experiments that will be 
conducted in order to evaluate the quality of the ABIPDP model we propose here.  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
A primary goal of our model is to integrate the planning of production and distribution processes with 
a very flexible formulation of optimization approaches in order to provide maximum adaptability in 
our approach to real world scenarios. To our knowledge, there are no satisfactory solutions to be found 
in literature on integrated production and distribution planning, so we will therefore be brief. Our 
approach also integrates decentralized scheduling; because we are especially interested in economic 
variants of scheduling we will discuss this in the second part of our review. Finally we touch the 
vehicle routing problem, because it will play a crucial role in the further development of the 
DISPOWEB model.  
2.1 Integrated Production and Distribution Planning 
In the recent years the seamless integration of production and distribution planning has become a 
focus of operations research. However, due to the complexity of the combined problem there are few 
papers that give a reasonable answer to how to couple both optimization problems. 
Sequential integration approaches solve the integrated production and distribution planning by a two 
phase process: the optimization results of the production planning are used as an input for the 
optimization of the distribution process. Centralized planning is chosen by Ertogral et al. (1998) who 
combine a pickup-and-delivery model with time windows (Li & Lim, 2002), with a multi-level multi-
item dynamic capacitated lot sizing problem (Stadtler, 2003). By employing a Lagrange 
decomposition approach, they are able to find solutions for the combined problems. Decentralized 
planning is chosen by Jung & Jeong (2005), who introduce an agent-based production and distribution 
planning system which generates feasible operational plans based on the negotiation process between 
production and distribution agents that incorporate individual objective functions for the each 
optimization goal in a decentralized supply chain structure. The focus of this approach is mainly on 
sequentially determining the optimal lot size in a multi-period model. It does not integrate route 
planning. Lau et al. (2006) also present a decentralized, agent-based supply chain scheduling model 
that employs the contract net protocol (Davis & Smith, 1983) in a distributed negotiation process to 
construct cost minimal production plans with respect to an objective function that integrates 
geographically dependent transportation costs, production costs, and costs for lateness.  
Simultaneous integration approaches are taken by Boudia et al. (2005), who design a centralized 
production and distribution planning system that has the objective of periodically calculating the 
appropriate production quantity and the delivery routes associated with the product dispatching, in 
order to minimize the total cost of production and distribution. The resulting combined problem 
formulation is solved using a greedy heuristic combined with a local search. Eksioglu (2002) examines 
an integrated production and distribution planning problem in a two-stage supply chain consisting of a 
number of facilities, all capable of producing the final product, and a number of retailers. Their model 
assumes that the retailers’ demands are known deterministically and there are no production or 
transportation capacity constraints. After formulating the problem as a network flow model with fixed 
charge costs, they solve the NP-hard problem using a primal-dual based heuristic. Lei et al. (2006) 
present an approach that is closely related to the previous one and operates on the production, 
inventory, and distribution routing problem. They are able to solve the combined production and 
distribution planning problem by a two phase process using mixed-integer programming and a 
heuristic algorithm approach. Sarimento & Nagi (1999) give an extensive analysis and categorization 
of integrated production and distribution planning problems that pursue the simultaneous simulation 
approach. It provides a comprehensive introduction to the problem class we are considering in our 
work. 
2.2 Weighted Job Interval Scheduling Problem and Economic Scheduling 
The Weighted Job Interval Scheduling Problem (WJISP) was introduced by Garey & Johnson (1977) 
and Potts & Van Wassenhove (1988). It is defined as the scheduling of a set of jobs, subject to release 
dates and due dates on a single machine, which can process at most one job at a time. The objective is 
to minimize the weighed number of late jobs, or equivalently to maximize the weighted number of 
early jobs (Koulamas & Kyparisis, 2001). This problem is shown to be NP-hard if the tasks are 
assumed not to be preemptive (Gordon & Kubiak, 1998). Meta-heuristics like genetic algorithms (GA) 
tabu search (TS) and simulated annealing (SA) are often used to solve the job-shop scheduling problem 
(JSSP) (Vaessens et al., 1996; Yamada & Nakano, 1996). They can easily be adapted for the WJISP. 
2.3 Capacitated Vehicle Routing and Scheduling Problem 
The quantitative exploration of the vehicle routing problem (VRP) was introduced by Dantzig et al. 
(1959). The VRP has prime place in logistics management and belongs to the class of NP-hard 
problems too. In practice the precedence relations between customers are often pre-determined 
because of exact service time or service time windows given by the customers.  This kind of VRP with 
time restrictions is termed Vehicle Routing and Scheduling Problem (VRSP) cp. e.g. Desrochers et al. 
(1990) and has also been addressed by meta-heuristics as for example in Gambardella et al. (1999). 
3 DESCRIPTION AND FORMALIZATION OF THE PROBLEM 
In general, the production facilities of the different tiers (and the end customers) of a supply chain or 
network are distributed geographically. Obviously, the due time of a producer is corresponds to the 
earliest pickup time for producers on subsequent tiers, and the release time of a producer or an end 
customer corresponds to the latest delivery time of the supplier. The pickup and delivery time intervals 
are defined by the contracts between the production and transport agents. In fact, the end customers in 
a supply network can be modelled as “degenerated” production agents, which have no customers. 
Thus, in the following we only consider two different agent types in the supply chain network, namely 
production agents (PA) and transport agents (TA). 
Although there is an abundance of production scheduling problems with various assumptions about 
the available resources and the order in which tasks may be processed by single resources or by 
bundles of them, we have chosen the classic Job Shop Scheduling Problem (JSSP) to illustrate our 
approach. Note that this is for illustrative ease only and the inter-agent negotiation would not change if 
we extended this to resource-constrained (multi-)project scheduling or any other production model 
with a bundle of fixed resources, release times and due dates for tasks and outsourcing opportunities:  
The JSSP is defined by several jobs and each of these jobs is closed by several tasks that have to be 
sequentially executed in different shops (seen as resources or bundles of resources able to process only 
a single task at a time). We identify each production agent with a shop. Furthermore, we extend the 
JSSP by introducing a valuation function that attributes constant economic weights to each of the 
single tasks in a job, instead of a valuation function for the jobs combined or the complete schedule. 
This way, for each production agent we obtain a weighted single machine scheduling problem. Figure 
1 depicts how the weighted JSSP can be broken down into (highly interdependent) subproblems, in 
which each production agent is exclusively concerned with the execution of its set of tasks. The 
resulting subproblems of the WJSSP are instances of the Weighted Job Interval Scheduling Problems 
(WJISP) as defined by Elendner (2003). The intervals of a PA’s WJISP are in accordance with the 
time interval between the supplier’s delivery time for the required preliminary products (or raw 
materials) from the PA’s predecessor, and the pickup time of the products provided to the PA’s 
successor. The execution time of production tasks is up to the PA but is restricted by the supply and 
delivery contracts. In contrast to the standard JSSP, now the goal is to minimize not so much the make 
span as the overall cost of outsourcing (as defined by the tasks’ weights, if they cannot be scheduled 
within their interval) while meeting all contract times. 
 
Figure 1: Decomposition of the Weighted JSSP into WJISPs. 
Similarly, we introduce constant weights for the single pickup and delivery tasks of a vehicle’s 
transportation tour. Each transport agent (TA) represents a capacitated vehicle and has to plan its 
optimal route for executing the pickup and delivery tasks. The individual pickup and delivery time at 
the PAs can be negotiated between the TAs and their contracting PAs. In analogy to the WJISP we 
introduce a weight for each transportation task and allow for outsourcing them by incurring that cost 
whenever the time window cannot be met. We label this “economic” extension of the CVRSP the 
Weighted Pickup and Delivery Interval Routing and Scheduling Problem (WPDIRSP). For the 
transport agents the optimization task is more challenging since vehicle routing decisions always 
involve sequence dependent setup times in their scheduling decisions. 
The negotiation of pickup and delivery times in our WJISP and WPDIRSP framework results either in 
a feasible situation without changing the cost structure or in an infeasible situation, i.e. one in which it 
would not be possible to execute all tasks in the given intervals. For this case we introduced an 
implicit outsourcing option which enables the agents to negotiate the external execution of a job in 
return for a payment. The following section summarizes the assumptions of our model. 
3.1 Assumptions of Production and Transportation Model 
Each job and tour respectively is composed of a number of subtasks to be executed sequentially (other 
inputs are not critical): Our agent-based WJISP adopted the assumptions of the classical JSSP, 
besides assuming that each task has a set of predecessors. The relaxation requires the WJISP's release 
times to be defined as the maximum of all contract times over all suppliers. In our WPDIRSP-Model 
each contract defines either a pick-up task or delivery task. But, as a producer or consumer several 
different contracts can be executed sequentially. 
Closed model with deterministic jobs: We assume every task to be known to the agents, i.e. they only 
renegotiate existing contracts. Extending to a dynamic model with emerging tasks is straightforward, 
however: Whenever a new service or product request has to be priced, the agent's WJISP and 
WPDIRSP defined by its current portfolio of 2n contracts is extended by two additional contracts.  
Existence of primary contract between producer and customer: Long-term relationships between 
production facilities are assured by primary contract which we do not have to deal with in our model. 
Pickup and delivery: Given the external demand for the products over a discrete time horizon, the 
pickup time at producer and delivery time at customer are negotiable by contracting between PA and 
TA. The negotiation mechanism applied by two agent types is identical. For the transport agents, the 
assumptions of our Model are based on that of the CVRP, but a heterogeneous vehicle fleet without 
stores is taken into consideration. To execute each corresponding pickup and delivery task the TA 
must pick up the products at first and then deliver them (precedence relations). 
Static costs for task outsourcing: Currently we assume an outsourcing option to be available for all 
tasks and every agent at all times, meeting whatever deadline the customer will require. While this 
simplification reduces the problem's complexity, it is true that in most economies for almost any 
product or service a substitute will be available at any time for a price below infinity. 
Unlimited compensation budgets: We assume each agent to have unlimited financial resources for side 
payments. Since the side payments only serve to compensate for economic value generated by 
relaxing the agent's scheduling constraints or to collaboratively escape suboptimal plans, the sheer 
number of re-contracting steps applied keeps the probability of persistent financial loss very low.  
3.2 Agents' Knowledge 
Denote by : { }P TA A A= ∪  the set of all agents consisting of the set of PAs AP and the set of TAs AT. 
Define : {0,1,2, , }T T= K  to be the discrete planning horizon of our model. Each agent 
a A∈ disposes of the common knowledge, namely A and T. 
3.2.1 Knowledge of Production Agents 
Contracts: PAs have two types of contract with their suppliers. 
Each supply contract ijkC  of Pi A∈  with Tk A∈  defines 
  jd ∈ : Demand for items (raw materials, intermediate products or final products) that must 
be produced by i  and picked up by k  in order to be delivered to j . 
  ( )ijpd kT C  ( 0 ( )ijpd kT C T< ≤ ): Production due time of i (equiv. to the pickup time of k at i ). 
Note that in a WJISP for a supply contract ijkC  of i with k , exactly one production task is to be done 
by i. Let :
T
s ij
kk A
C
∈
= ∪  be the set of supply contracts of i with all Tk A∈ , and Γ be the set of production 
tasks γ of i. Each task γ is defined by exactly one single contract ij skC ∈  of i. That is 
sΓ =  . 
 pγ ∈ :  Processing duration of task γ. 
 wγ ∈ : Outsourcing costs of task γ of contract
ij
kC . 
We suppose that for execution of task γ a set of input items are required and delivered by transport 
agent Tl A∈ . Then, each delivery contract 
hi
lC  between i  and l  specifies 
 id ∈ : Demand of i  for input items that must be delivered from ph A∈  to i  by l . 
 ( )hidd lT C  ( 0 ( ) ( )hi ijdd l pd kT C T C< < ): Desired delivery due time of l at i . 
:
T
d hi
kk A
C C
∈
= ∪ defines the set of delivery contracts of i with k . 
The sequence dependent setup time between task β and γ is denoted by βγϑ ∈ . 
Resource capacity: In WJISP the resource capacity icap ∈  of ia amounts to 1 unit. The demand irγ  
of the resource by task γ is either 0 or 1, because each task requires exactly one resource if executed. 
3.2.2 Knowledge of Transport Agents 
TAs have the following contract pairs: 
A pickup contract ijiC of Tk A∈ with pi A∈  consists of 
 
ij
iCd− ∈ (i.e. 0id ≤∈Z ): Demand for items that must be picked up by i  then delivered to i’s 
customer pj A∈ . 
  ( )ijpick iT C  ( 0 ( )ijpick iT C T< ≤ ): Pickup time of k at i (equiv. of production due time of i ). 
Symmetrically, k  has a delivery contract ijjC which is closed with j . ijjC defines 
 
ij
jCd ∈ : demand of j for items produced and picked up at prod. i , then delivered to cust. j .  
 ( )ijdeliv jT C  ( ( ) ( )ij ijpick i deliv jT C T C T<< ≤ ) indicates the delivery due time of k at j . 
Let Ci represent a pickup or delivery contract of the transport agent with any production agent i which 
either producing or receiving the products specified by contract Ci, i.e. { , }i ij kii iC C C∈  
( , ,  , .pi j k A i j i k∈ ≠ ≠ ). prod(Ci) and cust(Ci) declare the identity of i appropriate to Ci. Thus, i is 
either a producer or customer for the transported products. For example, we number the production 
agents serially. 13 14 13 141 1 3 4, , ,C C C C are contracts between Tk A∈  and PA 1, 3, 4, where PA 3, 4 are 
customers of PA 1. These contracts indicate that the items are to be picked up at PA 1 and then 
delivered to PA 3, 4. Therefore, 1 13 141 1{ , }C C C∈ , 3 133{ }C C∈ , 4 144{ }C C∈ , prod( 131C )=prod( 141C )= 
prod( 133C )= prod( 144C ) =1, cust( 131C ) = cust( 133C )=3, etc.  
Furthermore, a contract Ci has to comprise: 
 
iC
ip ∈ :  Processing (service) duration of a pickup or delivery task at i according to Ci. 
 iiCw ∈ : Outsourcing costs of contract C
i
 with producer or customer i specified by Ci.  
Additional information the TAs have available is as follows: ijτ ∈ defines the travel time from i  
to j , ijc ∈ the appropriate travel costs. The maximum load capacity of k  is limited to kcap ∈ . 
Summarized, the Relationships between production and transport agents in our supply chain can be 
shown as follows: ij ijhi hil l k khi hi ij ij
P T P T Ph i i j
C CC C
A A A A AC C C C
h l i k j∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈←→ ←→ ←→ ←→L L  It presents the 
relationships defined by contracts between PAs h, i, j  and TAs l, k  (cp. Figure 2). The notations 
above the arrows denote the delivery and supply contracts of PA with TAs, and notations under the 
arrows describe the pickup and delivery contracts of TAs with PAs. 
 
3.3 Agents' Costs and Schedule Optimization 
The common objective of each agent is to minimize the total operating and outsourcing costs of its 
tasks by determining an optimal production schedule or a transportation route and schedule. The 
agent’s internal scheduling optimization mechanism is described below.  
3.3.1 Internal Optimization of Production Agents 
The PA’s production planning consists of determining a single-machine schedule which minimizes the 
internal production and outsourcing costs, satisfies the external demands for intermediate or final 
products, fulfils the capacity constraints of resources and complies to the agreed production due time 
and delivery time of the supplier respectively. We suppose the production costs caused by processing 
the tasks on the shop to be constant. Then, only the delivery contracts and the outsourcing costs of 
them are relevant to the objective function. 
We assume that production agent i has n≥1 delivery contracts or production tasks to plan for. For 
production start and completion we introduce the dummy production tasks 0 and n+1. That is p0=pn+1= 
0. Let Sγ ≥ 0 denote the completion time of task ( {0,1, 1})nγ ∈Γ Γ = +K  and S0:= 0, Sn+1 the end 
time of production. Task γ can be dispatched if all input items required by processing the task γ have 
been delivered. That means the release time of task γ is { }: max ( ) | dddrt T C Cγ = ∈  . The estimated 
production due time dti ( i irt dt T< ≤ ) is given by a negotiation process. Let {0,1}yγ ∈  be a decision 
variable for task γ and {0,1}xβγ ∈  be a sequence assignment between tasks β and γ. yγ equals one 
exactly if task γ is completed. xβγ equals one exactly if task β is processed immediately before γ. The 
WJISP of each production agent can be formulated as follows, with an objective function of 
outsourcing costs minimization. 
Min. 
\{ 0 , 1}
(1 )
n
w yγ γ
γ ∈Γ +
−∑        (1) 
Subject to 
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0                                                                                       (3)
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=
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Constraint (2) says if task γ is executed immediately after β then the difference between the end of two 
processes can not be less than the minimal time lag pβ γ γϑ + . Time constraint (4) indicates that if task 
γ is released and processed, i.e. yγ=1, then the completion time Sγ must comply with the time windows 
given by ,r t p d tγ γ γ +  . Sγ and yγ become interdependent because of constraint (4) which says: if task 
γ is released and completed, i.e. Sγ >0 then yγ must equal one; if yγ equals zero then Sγ=0. Tasks are 
sequentially processed, meaning each task γ has exactly one predecessor and one successor. This 
condition is enforced by restrictions (6)-(7). 
3.3.2 Internal Optimization of Transport Agents 
The formulation of the scheduling optimization model of transport agents is more complex. Note that 
for the demand 0
ij
iCd− ≥  of producer i defined by ijiC (with i=prod( ijiC ), j=cust( ijiC )) and the 
demand 0
ij
jCd ≥ of customer j defined by ijjC  (with i=prod( ijjC ), j=cust( ijjC )) it holds that i jd d− = , 
i.e. all the products are to be picked up and delivered exactly once.  Analogous to the WJISP, each 
task or contract in a WPDIRSP which minimizes the travel costs and outsourcing costs is also to be 
dispatched and carried out only once. Each vehicle must start and end its tour at the depot. In addition, 
we require all items being picked up to be delivered, in other words, if pickup contract ijiC has to be 
fulfilled then the corresponding delivery contract ijjC must be executed, too. C0 and Cn+1 with 
0 1
0 1 0
nC C
n
p p
+
+= = are fictitious contracts between each transport agent and depot 0 and n+1, which 
represent the start and end points of transport services, respectively. Given n≥1 pickup and delivery 
contracts with producer and customer, let V:={0,1,...,n+1} be the set of locations to be travelled to, 
and let 0 1 1: { , } { , }n nC C C C+= ∪ K  denote the set of transport contracts. 
Min. 
{ ( ), ( )}
(1 )i j i i
i j i i i
C C
ij ij iC iC
i jC C C i prod C cust C
x c w y
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The formulation of WPDIRSP of transport agents as shown above with decision variables 
i jC C
ijx , {0,1}iiCy ∈ , 0
iC
iS ≥  (
0
0 0
CS = ) and integer auxiliary variable iCild representing the load of a 
vehicle at the arrival time at i in order to execute contract Ci. 
i jC C
ijx defines the sequence of transport 
services to execute contract Ci at i and Cj at j. i jC Cijx takes the value one exactly if i is served to 
complete contract Ci immediately before j to carry out Cj. iiCy is equal to one exactly if i is visited to 
execute Ci. 
iC
iS defines the completion time of Ci at i. 
Condition (9) enforces the minimal time lags between the ends of two different service tasks which are 
carried out sequentially. Restriction (10) gives the service time windows of contracts in the same way 
as restriction (4) in the WJISP-Model. (11) is equivalent to (5). Inequations (12)-(17) ensure that each 
contract Ci to be completed at i, has exactly one predecessor and successor respectively, if Ci is carried 
out. Moreover, each Ci will be dispatched and executed at most once. The customer j indicated by 
contract ijjC  cannot be visited before the producer i of
ij
jC .  The travel tour must be started at depot 0 
and closed at n+1, i.e. C0,Cn+1 must be performed. Constraints (18)-(19) guarantee that the maximum 
load capacity cap of vehicle will not be exceeded during the total service time at any producer or 
customer. The equality of the product quantity which is offered by producer i and required by his 
customers can be assured by formula (20). 
4 NEGOTIATION MECHANISMS 
In addition to the optimization of the PAs’ and TAs’ internal schedules, agents can try to relax their 
problems by increasing their temporal flexibility in order to maximize the utility of it’s individual 
contract situation, i.e. renegotiating for later contract dates with the subsequent tiers of the supply 
chain or earlier dates with the suppliers or delivering TAs in return for payment. However, since this 
relaxation or the agent’s own problem leads to a more constrained problem for the contracting agent, 
compensation payments will have to be negotiated to find an appropriate trade-off. 
4.1 Agents' Cooperative Contract Optimization 
Let us assume the consumer, i.e. the supply web’s last tier, is willing to pay for earlier deliveries. A 
total schedule with less idle time will thus result in earlier delivery times to the consumer and may 
generate additional profit that can be distributed among the supply web’s PAs and TAs. 
Each Agent has a schedule- (i.e. time-)dependent price function U*, which maximizes the utility of 
contract situation. U* is defined as follows: * ( ) max  ( , )
S
U U S
∈
⊂ =
S
C C  with the subset C of contracts 
set C and the corresponding optimal schedule S=(S0,...,Sn+1) from the set S of schedules. 
For every given schedule S, any PA or TA agent can calculate the opportunity cost incurred or 
additional benefit gained when moving the contract time (by defining either the PAs due date and TAs 
earliest pickup time, or the TAs latest delivery time and the PAs release time, as being equal). Since 
widening of an interval always leads to a relaxed WJISP or WPDIRSP these new problems always 
have the same or lower cost, while narrowing the time interval always generates a WJISP or 
WPDIRSP with the same or higher cost. 
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Figure 2: Time-dependent cost functions serving as a basis for re-contracting 
Let us illustrate this from the transport agents point of view (i.e. there is transportation at zero cost and 
thus PAs negotiate directly) and consider PA b in figure 2 (left): Re-contracting the release time of job 
1 (blue) from t = 20 to t = 23 or even later would render the scheduling of this task impossible. On the 
other hand, the resources freed by this would allow for the scheduling of the second task in an optimal 
solution which would lead to a total cost of 15 instead of 14 MU, i.e. a cost increase of 1 MU. 
Relaxing the contract to t = 18 or earlier would allow the scheduling of both the first and the second 
task, thus yielding an additional profit of 6. For agent 1 a contract time of 17 or earlier renders job 1 
(the upper one) impossible but in turn allows for scheduling the third task (third from top) causing a 
total cost increase of 6 MU. When relaxing the deadline to (at least) 21 however, all tasks can be 
scheduled by agent 1 (starting with the third one). 
Assuming both agents had agreed on a price x for t = 20, adding the respective cost deltas indicated in 
figure 2 (left) would define time-dependent price functions representing the agents’ opportunity cost 
or benefits. By communicating this function to the partner, each agent could calculate an optimal re-
contracting step. In our case, agreeing that t = 18 would lead to a total surplus of 6 MU that could be 
shared by the two agents. 
When calculating the price functions showing the optimal contract time for a task, we have to assume 
all other contracts are kept constant. This in turn means the re-contracting operation for task 1 now 
leads to outdated price functions for all other contracts of agent 1 and agent 3, i.e. updating would be 
required to determine whether their contracting time (i.e. the schedule dependent on it) is still optimal. 
This raises the question of whether it really is efficient to have the agent calculate the price functions 
for all points in time before communicating them, especially when the whole system of interdependent 
negotiations is still far from any equilibrium. 
Having this “social contract optimum” calculated by a central planner run into two problems: First, the 
agents lack any incentive to reveal the level of their internal knowledge to this central planner, and 
second, solving the global mixed integer optimization problem becomes prohibitive when we don’t 
want to consider just toy-size supply networks: such a toy example with 5 PAs and one single TA has 
already made ILOG CPLEX run for 1.13 seconds, and generate 976 nodes in 14024 iterations. 
In DISPOWEB we use a “memory-free” alternative, randomly choosing a time offset and then 
proposing this shift to the contracting party, making both agents estimate the implications of this one 
specific change only (by solving their respectively modified WJISPs or WPDIRSPs). Although this 
comes with the disadvantage of not finding the bilaterally optimal contract time for a given contact in 
one search step, it drastically reduces the number of WJISPs and WPDIRSPs to be solved by each 
agent. 
If the agents agree on a new delivery time (e.g. t = 18 in our scenario) and one agent profits more from 
the new delivery time than the other agent’s additional cost, the total profit is assumed to be shared 
equally. In the example: agent 3 makes a side payment of 3 MU to agent 1, leading to a situation 
where both agents profit from the change of the delivery contract. 
The extension of the model by logistics agents is now straightforward: Since PAs and TAs have the 
same “external interfaces” in the sense that they only re-negotiate time points of existing contracts, the 
interaction protocol does not have to depend on the agent type at all! Thus, between every two PAs we 
can simply “plug in” the according TA as though it were just an intermediate PA of the supply chain. 
Whether it has to solve a WPDIRSP internally instead of a WJISP (or any other economic scheduling 
problem with time windows) does not matter. What does matter, however, is the monotonicity of the 
scheduling problem’s function with respect to the time windows. Imagine all transport from PA a to 
PA b has been contracted to the same transport agent (TA 1), as depicted in figure 2 (right): If the trip 
from PA a to PA b takes 4 hours one way, the TA would have to outsource the second transport in 
order to be able to meet all his contracts if we assume all transports to require the full capacity of the 
truck. Be renegotiating the pickup time for the first task to be 2h earlier and the delivery time for the 
third to be 3h later, the logistics agent could save these outsourcing costs without incurring any 
additional expenses, either for  PA a or for PA b. 
4.2 Altruistic Negotiation and Avoiding Exploitation 
When evaluating this decentralized economic scheduling mechanism for a pure production scheduling 
network without logistics (Stockheim et al., 2005), we realized that this mechanism, when employed 
on heuristically generated initial schedules and contracts, would increase welfare by repeated re-
negotiation, but due to the strong interdependence of the schedules this process converges into sub-
optimal equilibrium sets of contracts. Although far from providing globally optimal schedules, no pair 
of agents has the opportunity to benefit from bilateral re-contracting. 
A modification of the re-contracting mechanism, extending the idea of simulated annealing to a 
collaborative optimization process, significantly improves the contracting equilibria reached: Instead 
of the “selfish” negotiation in which agents only accept those transition proposals which lead to a 
profit increase for the accepting agent (and, of course, for the proposing agent, too, otherwise it would 
never propose the contract modification and consequent side payment) we used an “altruistic” 
negotiation in which agents even accept contract changes which leave them worse off! The probability 
of such a negative proposal being accepted, however, is – as is common in simulated annealing – a 
decreasing function of the extent of the loss and the time or number of steps, the negotiation process is 
already running. As we see from the comparison in figure 3, after an initial phase of agreeing on 
“really bad contracts”, the altruistic agents usually generate much better contract equilibria when, with 
time, the probability of non-beneficial changes has decreased. 
         
Figure 3: Welfare increase of selfish (left) versus altruistic re-contracting (right) 
Unfortunately, the introduction of altruism makes the agents extremely vulnerable to exploitation. 
While the defecting agent may generate extraordinary profits (by always exaggerating the cost and 
under-reporting the benefits) the other agents may end up worse-off compared to their initial plans, 
most of their side payments going to the defecting agent, with no returns for themselves. 
The good news is that this problem may easily be circumvented by the introduction of so-called “trust 
accounts” (Stockheim et al., 2005) which limit each agent’s altruism towards a specific other agent: 
Whenever agent A’s initial credit for contractor B is used up, A will only accept  those re-contracting 
proposals of B that A will find beneficial. Our simulations showed that very small credit limits are 
sufficient protection against exploitation without sacrificing much of the additional benefits from 
altruistic re-contracting. 
5 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
In this paper we proposed a decentralized cooperative scheduling mechanism for a supply chain. Our 
mechanism is motivated by the assumption that agents who plan cooperatively in an integrated 
production and transport planning scenario are able to reduce supply chain costs significantly, 
compared with a centralized planning process that relies on traditional operations research methods 
where production and transportation planning are optimized separately. Our model relies on a twofold 
process: the supply chain partners optimize their internal process schedule on an inner level between 
themselves to minimize the in- and outsourcing cost of the overall production and transportation 
process by involving outsiders. To achieve this, production and transportation agents can improve 
their total profits by the re-negotiation of contract execution time with their partners in the supply 
chain. To prevent the permanent exploitation of agents who grant advantages to other contract partners 
in the negotiation process, we additionally propose the use of trust accounts. Our future work has to 
prove the advantages of our decentralized integrated production and transportation scheduling model 
over a centralized solution by conduction simulation studies based on real-world data. Further research 
issues could be the replacement of the WJISP with an economic version of a resource-constrained 
project scheduling model and the use of a multi-depot instead of a single-depot model. 
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